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Common-sense anti-racism in book group talk: The role of reported speech 
[submission to Discourse and Society] 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the rhetorical accomplishment by British book group members of 
anti-racist identities through their discussions of fictional texts exploring themes of race 
and immigration. What I am terming ‘common-sense anti-racism’ is a social action or 
stance that is presented as self-evidently taken by speakers (and assumed to be shared 
by other participants), yet explicitly flagged at the same time.  Speakers in book group 
discussions routinely display enlightened, anti-racist views principally by invoking the 
figure of the ‘racist other’ and their reported speech. Reported speech has been argued 
to possess evaluative or ‘editorializing’ functions in talk (Buttny 1997; Holt 2000), 
specifically by ‘ascribing words to out-group members as a way to criticize their 
actions’ (Buttny 2003: 107). Moreover, many of the analysed examples of reported 
speech do not involve explicit markers of quotation or shifts in footing, meaning that 
the attribution of certain words (and their accompanying values) have to be 
disambiguated by hearers assumed to share the same views on race and racism. The 
implicit status of the reported speech here does important identity work in consolidating 
the values of the group and strengthening its membership.  
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Adopting a broadly ethnomethodological approach, the paper also focuses on the 
rhetorical work done by the ‘common-sense’ presentation of anti-racism, its active 
orientation to the consensus of the group and arguably defensive ‘warding off’ of 
potential assumptions about the disposition or stance of the speaker in discussions of 
race and racism. It questions why anti-racism tends to be packaged as an accountable 
matter in need of some impression management in the way that racism often is, and 
concludes that this is linked to the way in which it operates in contexts where anxieties 
around issues of race and racism continue to exist. 
 
Keywords 
common sense, anti-racism, book group talk, reported speech, the racist ‘other’, 
discourse analysis, ethnomethodology. 
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Common-sense anti-racism in book group talk: The role of reported speech 
 
This paper emerges out of a three-year AHRC-funded project investigating the 
relationship between reading, location and migration
1
. Analysing a series of transcribed 
book group discussions across the UK and in parts of Africa, the Caribbean, India and 
Canada, one of our main aims has been to explore how various readers in different 
places respond to contemporary narratives of movement, migration and diaspora (see 
Benwell, Procter and Robinson, 2012). The choice of ‘diasporic fiction’ as our set texts, 
describing the lives of immigrant communities in Britain, such as Monica Ali’s Brick 
Lane, Zadie Smith’s White Teeth and Andrea Levy’s Small Island means that our 
groups’ discussions are clearly situated within a discursive landscape of British 
immigration, discourses of race, identity and belonging. 
 
Social and moral functions of book groups 
The focus of this particular paper is, however, less upon the issue of literary reception 
and evaluations of a series of specific texts and their characters, than upon some of the 
rhetorical, moral and identity work occasioned by the topics of ethnicity, race relations 
and immigration which tend to emerge in discussions of diasporic fiction in our UK 
                                                 
1
 Our project, Devolving Diasporas: was funded by the AHRC between 2007-2010 and involved 
researchers from Newcastle University (Procter and Kay) and from the University of Stirling (Benwell 
and Robinson). We recorded approximately 90 hours worth of book group discussions from 16 groups 
across a number of continents. 
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contexts. Elizabeth Long’s ethnographic study of women’s book clubs has commented 
in detail upon the book group as a site of identity production. Her study focuses 
particularly on the interface between a reader’s own personal experience and a book’s 
value as a realist text through a process of ‘self-recognition’ (2003: 153). But self-
recognition, of course, is not only an act in and of itself, but also a form of social action 
and identity work in interaction. When we turn to book group discussions, our corpus of 
data shows how participants locally manage their own presentation of identity and 
belief in discussions of race and race relations as morally accountable activities. 
The main analytical focus of this paper is the rhetorical accomplishment by 
British book group members of anti-racist identities through their discussions of 
fictional texts exploring themes of race and immigration. What I am terming ‘common-
sense anti-racism’ is a social action or stance that is presented as self-evidently taken by 
speakers, yet explicitly flagged at the same time – what Derek Edwards describes as 
‘designed visibility’ (Edwards 1997: 99). Speakers appear to need to establish their 
enlightened anti-racist credentials and dispel any possibility of being deemed racist in 
discussions of fictional texts that portray racism. This delicate (and sometimes 
defensive) stance seems to characterise a particular kind of educated, liberal, white, 
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western consciousness in relation to issues of immigration
2
, particularly in a British 
context
3
.  
Common Sense 
Common sense is defined by the New Shorter OED as ‘[g]ood sound practical sense in 
everyday matters’ and ‘[t]he faculty by which certain beliefs are generally accepted 
without philosophical enquiry’ (1993: 454). Garfinkel describes common-sense 
knowledge thus: ‘socially sanctioned grounds of inference and action that people use in 
everyday life, and which they assume that other members of the group use in the same 
way’ (1956: 185). Thus ‘common sense’ is already owned, collectively and 
consensually held and is a form of knowledge or stance that does not require evidence, 
research or justification: it is ‘ordinary’ and ‘untutored’ (OED online, 2011). For this 
reason it has great ideological potential: when propositions are rhetorically packaged as 
‘reasonable’ or ‘commonsensical’, any ideological or biased underpinnings are rendered 
invisible, and possible alternatives are omitted from the discussion.   In this way, 
common sense is not merely a category or repository of knowledge, but also operates as 
a type of reasoning, justification or accounting in its own right. It is a form of rhetoric 
                                                 
2
 Gilroy ( 1987: 117) observes that anti-racist movements in the UK have been largely directed and 
promoted by whites acting in the interests of race relations. 
3
 Research in other national contexts, particularly Australia and New Zealand, suggests that racist 
discourses (particularly those directed towards Indigenous populations) are arguably more prevalent and 
tolerated, and thus constraints on voicing anti-racist sentiments exist, e.g. Mitchell, Every and Ranzijn 
2011; Van den Berg, Wetherell and Houtkoop-Steenstra 2003; Wetherell and Potter 1992. 
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that is invoked to support a particular view or argument, to naturalise ideological 
positions, and crucially to suppress debate.  
Common-sense reasoning and its functions have been discussed by a number of 
writers working within the fields of Social and Discursive Psychology and 
Ethnomethodology  – disciplines in which the ‘exposure’ of commonsense is in many 
ways central to the analytical enterprise. ‘Common-places’ – types of well-established 
moral aphorisms or maxims (Billig 1996: 21), ‘shared knowledge’ (Edwards 1997: 
255), ‘mundane reasoning’ (Pollner 1987) ‘mundane common sense’ (Edwards 1997: 
52), ‘common understandings’ (Garfinkel 1967), ‘common-sense knowledge’ (McHoul 
and Watson 1984), ‘script formulations’: ‘how actions and events are described as more 
or less routine or expectable’ (Edwards 1994: 211), ‘categorial formulations’ (Stokoe 
2010; 2012):  person category references which intrinsically index some kind of 
intersubjective agreement about them, e.g. ‘that sort of laddish bloke’, and ‘folk 
theories’ (Edwards 1997: 255), are all standard devices for factual accounting and 
formulating an assumed consensus in interaction (whether one actually exists or not).  
One of the interesting properties of common sense is that it simultaneously 
dispenses with the need for accounting (i.e. if a position is commonsensical it does not 
need to be justified – it is inevitable, natural and undeniable), whilst being in and of 
itself a form of accounting: 
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The rhetorical force of this device is that it appears to be invoking self-evident, undeniable, 
obvious knowledge, while at the same time accomplishing things as so… in a manner that makes 
denial difficult (Edwards 2007: 256) 
 
The accounting function of common sense is thus, despite its appeal to commonly held 
beliefs, suggestive of the anticipation of and need to counter a possible ‘other view’ 
(Billig 1996) and thus a means of refuting possible counter descriptions. 
A variety of discursive forms are associated with the accomplishment or display 
of common sense in interaction, some of which are rhetorically designed ‘to make 
denial difficult’ such as the use of ‘extreme case formulations’ (Pomerantz 1986), 
appeals to participant intersubjectivity including elliptical or generalising formulations 
such as ‘y’know’ (what Schiffrin 1987: 276 describes as a ‘marker of consensual 
truths’) and ‘that sort of’, general extenders or list completors (Jefferson 1990) such as 
‘and so on’, ‘stuff like that’, ‘etcetera’, and, as we shall see shortly, forms of reported 
speech. 
Examples of these discursive forms can be seen in our first example of common-
sense anti-racism which shores up the ‘taken-for-granted’ status of anti-racism within 
this interactional context: 
 
EXTRACT A 
1  S5  but (0.5) I mean hhh well I suppose I (0.2) I was (drawn up 
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2 in) the middle class family (0.6) they weren’t quite Posy 
3 Simmonds because (0.2) they (.) the wife says to them where 
4 are you from? and they both say Wi:llesden and she does that 
5 stupid thing of saying but where be↑fore that? (2.0) just 
6 cause they’re bro:wn 
(Glasgow WI  White Teeth) 
 
In this example the speaker appeals to a shared, ‘common-sense’, non-racist  
understanding that the view that ethnicity must map exclusively on to nationality is an 
inaccurate and ignorant one, and in this way the racist view is ‘othered’ – ‘that stupid 
thing’. This is also a generalised formulation which appeals to shared knowledge about 
the existence of this familiar, repeated form of racism. The recreation of direct reported 
speech here simultaneously lends empirical support to the observation (such questions 
plausibly do occur in reality), and functions to signal the negative evaluation of the 
reported speaker’s views (see also Buttny 1997; Buttny and Williams 2000; Holt 2000; 
Stokoe and Edwards 2007). The functions of reported speech will be elaborated later in 
the paper.     
 
EXTRACT B 
1  S1 I always find it amazing that people say (.) ooh you know the 
2 >sort of classic< they come to our country they should be 
3 like u:s (0.8) but you know British pe:ople who go abro:ad are 
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4 ↑↑they going to want to assimilate? Heh heh heh 
(Edinburgh PB White Teeth) 
 
In this second example, the speaker uses extreme case formulations (‘always find it 
amazing’), the generalised second person pronoun in the phrase ‘y’know’, and a form of 
reported speech prefaced by ‘the sort of classic’ in order to voice a belief which is 
clichéd, well worn and familiar to listeners. 
By contrast, in the following example, we see a display of anti-racism by S6 
which is arguably not presented as tacit ‘common sense’ but expounded explicitly as an 
opinion and with no evident indication that any of its assumptions are already shared by 
its listeners: 
 
EXTRACT C 
1  S6 yeah yeah but I think what (0.2) what is imperative f- for all 
2  of us is (.) er (0.4) when the that fe:ar is not to let our 
3 fear cloud our judgement 
4  S5 ah 
5  S6 and whenever we deal with people er to give them the benefit 
6 of the ↑do:ubt  
7  S5 yes 
8  S6 and a nice young man with a be:ard (.) is (.) maybe just a 
9   <nice young man> ↑with a be:ard (0.2) and he happens to be 
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10 Muslim 
11 S5 yeah 
12 S* yep 
13 S6 and we just have to go on living like this 
14 S5 yes 
15 and (0.5) because it’s taken so long to re:ach this 
16 S5 yes 
17 S6 and I have seen in the <thirty forty> years that I’ve been 
18 <this year it’s going to be forty years I’ve been married 
19 (0.2) I’ve seen there’s a huge improvement 
20 S5 yes 
21 S6 here and er it’s ↑very positive and this is something that we 
22  all have to stand up for (.) and not let the fear (0.6) take 
23 over and and yes.  
24 S* yeah 
25 S* what a good point to end on 
26 S11 it is yeah lo:vely (0.5) wo:nderful 
(Edinburgh PB White Teeth) 
 
Indeed, the responses of the other members are indicative that this sequence 
of talk occupies the status of a ‘point’ (l.25) within a debate. It was precisely the almost 
unique appearance of this form of persuasive anti-racism within our data that alerted me 
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to the fact that anti-racism is much more normatively packaged as a tacit, common-
sense notion within the talk of our book group members.  
 
‘New Racism’ and common sense racial discourse 
And yet, why is it that anti-racism is so uniformly tied to common sense across our data, 
particularly when common sense has been shown to operate as a way of suppressing 
dissent? There have been a number of studies into discourse about race which have 
shown that common sense is a rhetorical manoeuvre which is commonly employed 
where speakers are keen to distance themselves from any inference that their views 
might be deemed prejudiced on the basis of race. Most studies of race talk in the past 
few decades have been oriented to what has been termed ‘the new racism’, after a study 
of public discourse about immigration by Martin Barker in 1981. Influential studies of 
discourse about race and immigration across a range of written and spoken, public and 
private contexts (Billig, 2001; Bonilla-Silva and Forman 2000; Rapley, 1998; Van den 
Berg et al, 2003; Van Dijk, 1991, 1992; Wetherell and Potter, 1992) have tended to 
focus on white speakers or writers and a series of rhetorical strategies which anticipate 
the view that their beliefs (about e.g. immigration, inequality) are likely to be heard as 
racist (due to their negative presentation of the qualities or actions of particular ethnic 
groups), and which thus sets out to deny this, either explicitly or implicitly. These 
rhetorical strategies are designed to offer reasoned support for views which might be 
13 
 
deemed racist to avoid the imputation that irrational, race-based prejudice is what 
motivates them in a social climate where ‘common-places of prejudice… have been 
removed from dialogue, or public thought’ (Billig 1996: 217). Van Dijk (1987), for 
instance, identifies ‘examples’ (where specific negative instances relating to e.g. an 
ethnic minority individual are used to offer empirical substantiation for more generally 
negative views) and ‘apparent concessions’ (where sympathy or a positive evaluation is 
initially directed at one aspect of an ethnic minority group’s circumstances before a 
more damning verdict is offered). Barnes, Palmary and Durrheim (2001) in a study 
looking at mixed race interactions in informal settings observed a series of strategies 
deployed by white speakers to manage the potential for their views to be read as racist 
in the company of a mixed race couple: these included humour, personal experience 
(again drawing on an empiricist register) and imputing racist views to other people. 
Edwards (2003) observes a range of strategies linked to the accomplishment of common 
sense in the talk of white New Zealanders discussing race and immigration, such as 
appeals to intersubjectivity (y’know), vague and generalising formulations, and the 
description of consistent experiences (linking to the rational, empirical basis for 
judgements). Buttny (1997), examining the speech of both white and African American 
students on an American campus observes that reported speech is used by both groups 
of students as a way of negatively representing others’ actions in the context of 
troublesome racialized events. 
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However, we might ask, why does anti-racism need rhetorical work to make it 
presentable? Why might it also be an accountable matter in need of impression 
management in the way that racism is? Given the ‘powerful norms of anti-racism’ 
(Barnes et al, 2001: 326) that currently exist in our society (and particularly across our 
book groups, where members are largely educated, middle class and liberal in their 
politics), why isn’t anti-racism either so ‘taken for granted’ that it is truly invisible, or 
promoted in an opinionated way as we saw in the isolated example above? The active 
‘common-sense’ presentation of anti-racism - securing consensus, avoiding debate, 
whilst at the same time implicitly countering an ‘other’ view - is suggestive that it 
operates in contexts where anxieties around issues of race and racism exist. 
Interestingly across our corpus of data, we were able to identify a series of 
rhetorical strategies linked to the accomplishment of common-sense anti-racism which 
were remarkably consonant with strategies linked to new racism and the denial of 
prejudice, including generalising formulations, markers of intersubjective 
agreement and reported speech. Both ‘new’ racism and anti-racism are arguably 
mobilised by the same stigma that attaches to the irrationality of racism and the desire to 
‘dodge the identity of prejudice’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 211). Both types of 
strategy are aimed at achieving membership of the ‘“moral community” of the non-
prejudiced’ (Barnes, Palmary and Durrheim, 2001: 324), even if the ultimate motives 
for this differ. The same rhetorical discourses may thus be deployed in pursuit of 
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ideologically opposing goals, an observation that has been replicated in research that 
has examined how the same rhetorical strategies are often used in pursuit of both racist 
and anti-racist arguments (Fozdar, 2010; Verkuyten, De Jong and Kees Masson, 2002); 
so, for example, an ‘equality’ argument may be invoked to both support and refute the 
principle of affirmative action. As Billig points out, ‘the same common-sense [may] be 
the location of arguments which contradict one another’ (1996: 203). Similarly, the 
rhetorical function of common sense means that it has an inherently argumentative or 
‘dilemmatic’ structure (Billig et al 1988; Billig 1996), meaning that various common-
sense discourses may come into conflict with one another in the form of ‘contrary 
commonplaces’ (Billig, 1996: 202) (e.g. ‘fairness’ vs ‘empathy’) thus shoring up the 
commonsensical ‘rightness’ of two opposing ideological positions on race relations. 
More generally, the range of research examining what we might broadly term 
‘race talk’ points to a consistent form of impression management which links a range of 
dispositions to the topic of race to strategies deployed in mitigating inferences of 
racism. Any topic which invokes the possibility of race discourse (such as immigration, 
migrant integration, racism) with or without any suggestion of a prejudiced or racist 
stance, is likely to be handled with great delicacy and with an awareness of the 
existence of a series of shared discourses and tropes of which co-participants will also 
be aware. Whitehead (2009), for instance, observes in a study of race training sessions, 
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that people orient to what he terms ‘racial common sense’ while at the same time 
‘managing how their actions will be understood in the light of it’ (329).  
We will now turn to an examination of how common-sense anti-racism is 
commonly accomplished in interaction. 
 
Othering the Racist 
A prevalent strategy for the performance of ‘common-sense anti-racism’ is the process 
of ‘othering’ – the construction of an overtly racist group against which the speaker’s 
values are implicitly contrasted. This has resonances with Richard Buttny’s work on the 
use of reported speech in race talk as a means of constructing a ‘portrait of the other’ 
(1997: 480), but where Buttny’s ‘other’ is characterised along ethnic lines (a ‘racial 
other’), our speakers constuct an ‘other’ which is drawn along ideological ones (the 
‘racist other’). This process of self identification contextualises readers’ responses to a 
fictional text in which racism is a dominant theme, and by locating speakers 
ideologically, also performs important identity work within the group itself. 
In this short excerpt, participants have been discussing a kind of common-sense 
racism that is associated with an older generation and frame their response to the racism 
portrayed in Small Island during the war in terms of their own ‘enlightened’ and 
commonsensically non-racist identities. 
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EXTRACT D 
1  S1 but I mean ↑people (0.4) still behave that way (.) in 1994 we 
2      went on holiday to Tenerife and we went to one of these ↑shows 
3 (0.2) and we were at a table with other British people >they  
4 were Welsh< in fact (.) and (.) the Drifters came on and I’ve  
5 never heard of them before (.) and they came on and this man  
6 said to us (.) shall we throw bana:nas? (0.2) and we didn’t  
7 understand (.) what he me:ant  
8  S* HEh heh heh 
9  S1 so he re↑peated it (.)and ex↑plained to uhs 
10 S2 heh hh I don’t believe that  
11 S1 but we left about £twenty minutes later you know £we felt £we  
12  can’t sit here 
13 S2 well I’m wondering if the Welsh have cha:nged much because  
14 there was a conversation that Danny was having with a Welsh  
15  (.) man on holiday last year in Corfu: and <he said I can’t  
16 believe what that man’s saying to me it was just (0.2) you  
17 know the way he was talking about the Greek folk n (0.2) you  
18 know like (.) it’s like you think wh- have ↑these people got  
19 no conception…  
(Glasgow WI, Small Island) 
 
Here the ‘racist other’ identities are gradually reified and closed off by a series of 
increasingly specific identifiers: firstly the vaguely defined ‘people’ (line 1), then 
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‘British people’ (line 3) and finally the nationally-specific ‘Welsh’ (line 4), a group of 
whom have been making racist jokes about an African American pop group, The 
Drifters during a holiday in Tenerife. S2 orients to S1’s mention of Welsh identity 
(lines 3-4) – which is packaged by S1 as an incidental observation, but is arguably 
marked by its mention – and retrospectively endows it with homogeneity by linking this 
anecdote via a second story (Sacks 1992) to another example of racism her friend or 
partner, Danny encountered when talking to a Welsh speaker about the Greek 
community whilst on holiday in Corfu (lines 14-17).  This nationally delineated and 
apparently homogenous identity (‘the Welsh’ (line 13) and ‘these people’ (line 18)) 
allows a clear contrast with the Scottish speakers, enabling them to distance themselves 
from the racist behaviour described. Reported discourse is used to present both the 
damning words of the racist ‘other’ group as well as to provide direct access to the 
unmediated thoughts of the speaker and her party. The recipients (S* and S2) of S1’s 
story assess the reported speech through laughter (lines 8 and 10), making its evaluative 
function explicit, a move observed by Elizabeth Holt (2000) in her analysis of 
‘concurrent responses to reported speech’.   
 Common-sense anti-racism is often constructed by the attribution of racism to an 
‘other’, older generation, who are simultaneously exonerated by the fact of being a 
product of their historical (and racist) conditions: 
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EXTRACT E 
1  S1 I (.) I mean (0.5) my daughters are absolutely appalled and I  
2 was I mean <my parents are well educated (.) em peo↑ple (0.2)  
3 and my father has worked widely across the wo:rld (.) but he  
4 can come out with some things sometimes that y’know  
5 (0.2)leaves me absolutely breathless and (0.2) totally appals  
6 his ↑grandchildren [.hhhh] ↑↑why does he s- ! and he doesn’t  
7 actually if you pull him u:p 
8  S2 uhuh 
9  S1 he’s horrified at the thought that anybody would think he was  
10 ↑like that but it’s just common (0.4) ↑↑parlance to him 
(Glasgow, WI  Small Island) 
 
What is striking here are the accounts provided for the parents’ racism. It is neither 
ignorance, lack of education or a desire to ‘be’ racist, but a naturalised outlook and way 
of talking: ‘just common parlance to him’. However, despite this ostensible sympathy 
(reminiscent of Van Dijk’s ‘apparent concessions’ (1987)) for the unwitting nature of 
her father’s racism, the speaker reveals the imperative of distancing her own stance 
from any possible imputation of racism by the use of extreme case formulations (‘leaves 
me absolutely breathless’, ‘totally appals’, ‘horrified’), her moral account of ‘pull[ing] 
him up’, and her own reported speech (‘↑↑why does he s[ay]!’ line 6) creating a sense 
of unmediated access to her original appalled response. A similar pattern of exoneration 
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combined with ‘othering’ can be observed below where the speaker explicitly 
characterises her parents’ racism as such whilst accounting for it as an inevitable, 
unwitting product of its time (and thus implicitly constructing anti-racism as a product 
of this time): 
 
EXTRACT F 
1  S1 well of cou- absolutely <but I just (.) I can well I  
2 suppose it’s things like with my mum and da:d (0.2) I  
3 kno:w they kind of want to know (.) cause my mum and  
4 dad are very much of the generation that would have  
5 recei:ved the people of the (.) on the Wi:ndrush  
6 really (0.4) and are prejudiced without (.) y’know  
7 without even having a ↑clue to the point that  
8  S2 even knowing it 
9  S1 mmm (0.2.) they say things like ↑I’m not raciali:st  
10 we’re not racialist ↑here  
11 Grp Heh heh heh 
(Nottingham WT/SI) 
 
Again, reported speech prefaced by generalising particles (‘they say things like’) is  
deployed to register disapproval for the views of the unintentionally racist parents.  
As we saw in extract D, the evaluative function of the reported speech is made explicit  
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by the concurrent laughter by the whole group in line 11. 
 
Anti-racism as common knowledge: the role of reported speech 
One of the most commonly observed features of common-sense anti-racism across our 
data, and a phenomenon already noted in much of the data so far examined, is the use of 
reported speech. Reported speech or quotation has been categorised by Clark and Gerrig 
(1990) as a kind of ‘demonstration’: something that is linked to direct experience but 
mediated by a dramaturgical or role-taking function. Crucially, it is a selective or partial 
demonstration of some prior event, which may be specific in time or space, or which 
may be generic, habitual, typified or even hypothetical. Clark and Gerrig observe two 
main functions for the use of reported speech in talk: direct experience and 
detachment (1990: 792). Stokoe and Edwards (2007) have observed both these 
functions in the use of reported racist insults by complainants to neighbour mediation 
services or the police, where the reported quote of the racist offender both offers a kind 
of empirical robustness  or ‘factuality’ (Myers 1999: 382) to their evidence (p.339; see 
also Buttny 2003: 106; Holt 1996), but also serves to dissociate the speaker from the 
insult (Clark and Gerrig 1990: 793; see also Buttny 2003: 106; Goffman 1974; Myers 
1999: 376), rather offering up the insult to the listener as an indirect assessment of the 
original speaker’s character and motives, commonly in ‘complaint’ narratives (Buttny, 
2003: 106; Holt, 2000: 435-439; Stokoe and Edwards, 2007: 347). The role of reported 
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speech in constructing evaluations or assessments is a crucial one in interaction. It has 
also been observed by Buttny (1997) in his study of racial discourse on a college 
campus, where he found that speakers would use reported speech overwhelmingly to 
criticise others, a function we observe most commonly in this study. 
Across our data we find a number of realisations of reported speech which 
reveal a certain consistency of form and function. We have already seen an example of 
reported speech as a conveyance of direct experience or even direct emotion: ‘[.hhhh] 
↑↑why does he s- !’, the sharp intake of breath followed by a high pitched, recreation of 
an imagined incredulous response by the speaker. However, most of our examples of 
reported speech have an ironic and critical function, serving to characterise the views 
and voice of usually a racist ‘other’ as an indirect form of critical commentary and 
conforms to Buttny’s view that ‘reported speech is relevantly tied to assessment’ (1997: 
477). Most of these examples use generalising particles as a way of typifying the speech 
as habitual, occurring over and over (e.g. ‘they say things like I’m not racialist we’re not 
racialist here’; ‘people say oh you know the sort of classic they come to our country 
they should be like us’ (itallics added). These are thus generic referents and hypothetical 
albeit familiar or ‘prototypical’ (Buttny, 2003: 105) speech reports of what a certain 
(often unidentified) group of people are likely to say. By juxtaposing the generalising 
particles with the reported speech, arguably common sense is being deployed as a way 
of characterising, stereotyping and stigmatising the racist view. 
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 In the next example, the speaker is characterising the racist views of her mum’s 
Latvian cleaner who is talking about Polish migrants in the UK.  
 
EXTRACT G 
1  S6  my mum’s cleaner is from Latvia (.) and even she’s disgusted  
2    by the ignorance of £Polish ◦people◦ and heh ↑↑£you just think  
3  that you’ve been here three £four years >or something< ((high  
4  sing-song voice)) ↑↑and they all come o↑ver and they don’t  
5  wo:↑rk (0.4)there are ↑↑plenty of jobs ((normal voice)) (1.0)  
6  and you just think ↑okay (.) fair enough (0.2) <which is a  
7  sha:me actually but (       ) 
8  S5  ye:ah. 
9  S6      it seems a bit strange 
 (Edinburgh FB, Extra Time in Paradise) 
 
The paralinguistic notes in the transcription itself (‘high sing-song voice’ and ‘normal  
voice’) suggests that the speaker adopts two distinct voices to make the separation 
between her views and the cleaner’s views apparent, given the absence of a  
reporting verb. The speaker uses direct reported speech (lines 4-5) which  
lampoons the Latvian cleaner’s generalising and arguably racist opinions regarding  
Polish migrants
4. The ironic status of the report is evident by S6’s use of a high ‘sing- 
                                                 
4
 Ironically, in doing so, she makes a generalising judgement about Latvians. 
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song’ tone to convey the apparently reported speech (though she doesn’t mimic an East 
European accent), a kind of delivery that has been described as having an ‘annotative’  
(Clark and Gerrig 1990: 68), or ‘marking’ (Mitchell-Kernan, 1972) function which  
allows such things as prosody, gesture, and facial expression to offer an implicit  
commentary on the utterance. However, the absence of a reporting verb (‘free direct  
speech’ (Leech and Short, 1981: 22); ‘zero-quotative’ (Yule, Matnis and Hopkins,  
1992)) also indexes the speaker’s confidence in the shared and ‘commonsensical’  
grounding of her reporting in an anti-racist interpretive context.  However, even within  
the speaker’s ‘own’ words, shades of the cleaner’s voice are apparent. Prior to the  
reported speech, S6 refers to the ‘ignorance’ of Polish people (line 2), and although she 
is not directly quoting her cleaner here, it seems apparent from the otherwise anti-racist  
orientation of the rest of the turn, that the word ‘ignorance’ is a kind of quotation  
(arguably a form of free indirect discourse) and not one that S6 would normally deploy. 
 Free indirect discourse is a form of indirect speech or thought without reporting clauses  
and usually constitutes a third person narration (with the attendant grammatical feature  
of the past tense) which nonetheless conveys the style, tone, views and perspective of  
the subject of the narration. It is commonly found in literary genres, and used in order to 
 convey the ‘colour’ and expression of a particular character’s view, often as a form of  
mimicry (see Gunn 2004 for a clear account). It occurs occasionally in these displays of  
‘common-sense anti-racism’ as we will see in further examples.  
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 In the next example, the boundaries between reported speech and non-reported 
speech are less prosodically explicit:  
 
EXTRACT H 
1  S1 [and then you get it now excep]t it’s about Mu:slims 
2  S2 [can see now how it goes there]   
 (1.0) 
3  S2 yeh 
4  S1 all Muslims are bad <anybody (0.2) brown skinned is a Muslim  
5     whether they’re Hindus or not doe:sn’t matter  
6  S2 yes 
7  S1 they’re just all lumped together as Mu:slims (0.4)and Muslim  
8   equals ba:d 
(Glasgow WI, Small Island) 
 
In line 4, S1 voices a hearably racist view that ‘all Muslims are bad <anybody (0.2) 
brown skinned is a Muslim’, which we infer is a reported view by the way she then 
distances herself from it in her critical commentary in lines 5 and 7.  Nonetheless, 
shared, common-sense knowledge that such a view is meant ironically is also crucial to 
disambiguate it in the absence of any reporting verb or prosodic clues.  We can compare 
this example to a very similar rhetorical move noted by Myers in a study of reported 
speech in focus group discussions, which he describes as free indirect discourse:  
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2 your multinationals took in Bhopal . and look what happened there… with those poor people… 
… 
1 it didn’t matter did it . cause they were only Indians 
2 exactly  ]      
(Myers 1999: 337) 
 
The connections between free indirect speech as a form of reporting and irony have 
been frequently documented, particularly in stylistic analyses (Gunn 2004), and the 
irony is not hard to detect here, particularly as the speakers in both extracts seem to be 
expressing an opinion opposite to that genuinely held by them. Both ‘echoic mention’ 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1981) and ‘pretense’ (Clark and Gerrig, 1984) theories of irony 
capture the verbatim and dramaturgical aspects of reported speech in the examples 
examined here. Shoaps (2010: 300) argues that ‘irony has more in common with 
reported speech than it does with metaphor or negation’ and both serve similar functions 
in making reference to shared norms and standards (often by contravening them). But 
like irony, reported speech has an evasive status, its words dissociated from the current 
speaker, and its intentions ultimately ambiguous.  It is therefore an ideal mode of 
discourse to employ in interactional contexts where topics are liable to invoke 
disagreement or where (to quote Myers 1999) ‘the views of speakers are not yet 
known’. We will return to some of these considerations in the paper’s conclusions. 
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 The range of types of reported speech and frequent absence of explicit 
boundary markers within even a single turn is a useful marker of the intersubjective 
agreement presumed to exist between speaker and hearer, and a versatile means of 
establishing an anti-racist stance. 
  
EXTRACT I 
1   S5 I know it’s I mean I kno:w (.) I’ve heard people going on that  
2   they fought the Second World War (0.2) to make the country  
3 British >and all this< and now there’s all these >Polish  
4 people< ↑oh but we’re not against Polish people but it’s all  
5 (0.2) ↑criminals that are ↓coming and (.) see their people are  
6 getting brai:nwashed  (0.4)  
7  S1 yeah [it’s interesting 
8  S5         [‘cause it’s the media 
(Edinburgh PB White Teeth) 
 
In this example, the boundaries between different forms of reported speech are even 
more ambiguous, particularly as some are not cued by explicit quotatives. The first bit 
of reported speech is introduced using a reporting verb ‘going on’ and begins as 
indirect speech, ‘that they fought the Second World War’, which is curtailed by the 
dismissive generaliser, ‘and all this’ (which is uttered with a more ‘rushed’ delivery 
signalled by the ‘greater than’ symbols in the transcript) before morphing imperceptibly 
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into a form of free indirect speech ‘and now there’s all these >Polish people<’. In this 
way, the sentiment ‘and now there’s all these >Polish people<’ could be ambiguously 
ascribed to an anonymous group who hold the potentially racist views that the speaker 
is subtly lampooning. Again, the distinction between free indirect and free direct speech 
is ambiguous here
5
. The fact that these words are presumably not those of the speaker 
herself can only really be determined by other elements of the discourse context, such as 
the previously dismissive characterisation of the indirectly reported views of ‘people 
going on’ as well as by the free direct speech (direct reported speech without a 
reporting verb), which follows and which is arguably cued as such by the discourse 
marker, ‘↑oh’: ‘↑oh but we’re not against Polish people’.  
The absence of explicit markers of the boundaries between these different kinds 
of speech has been observed by Myers (1999: 396) as something which listeners are 
almost always competent to decode, even in the absence of clear cues, but whose 
interpretations can be recovered from subsequent turns. The shared knowledge that such 
a conversational strategy invokes is a clear example of common sense rhetoric: ‘when 
speakers demonstrate only a snippet of an event, they tacitly assume that their 
addressees share the right background to interpret it in the same way they do’ (Clark 
and Gerrig, 1990: 793). Such rhetorical moves also contribute to the establishment of 
intersubjectivity and affiliation in talk (Holt 2000: 451). 
                                                 
5
 Holt has remarked that the distinction between direct and indirect forms of reported speech are not 
always clear cut in interaction (Holt 1996: 243; 2000: 427) 
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 Our next example provides a clear illustration of how such ‘embedded’ quotations 
are processed by listeners and deployed to consolidate the anti-racist stance that is being 
jointly constructed across speaker turns. In this example (from Penzance in Cornwall), 
racism is attributed to ‘the people’ (and the definite article here implies a homogenous 
identity) in respectively Peterborough and London. Earlier in this section of talk, one 
speaker has described as ‘shocking’ the way black servicemen were treated after the 
war, but then another speaker notes that racism still persists in contemporary society:  
 
EXTRACT J 
1  SA    but you know it it still happe:ns ah in Peter- I used to live  
2  in Peterborough (0.2) ◦and er◦ (.) the same thing happened (.)  
3  ther- the people would say (0.2)<↑ ‘f you get one Pa:ki> (0.6)  
4  (0.4)they’re all o:ver the place.  
5  SB  yes 
6  SA  ↑one Paki in the street and everybody starts moving on↓ (.)   
7  and ↑this is (.) you know (.) ten fifteen years ago. (0.2) so  
8  there’s nothing (.) changed all that much= 
9  SB  =well it’s happening right now because I’ve got  people from  
10  London on one side and people from London on the ↑other side 
11  and they’ve both (.) told me that they’ve moved here to get  
12  away from the ↑◦bla:cks◦ (0.2) and that’s happening ↑no:w  
13  because this was last ye:ar when they moved in (0.2) so it’s  
14  still going on 
30 
 
15 SC  ◦◦and the Cornish are moving to get away from the Londoners◦◦ 
16 Group -s ys Heh heh heh heh 
(Penzance, Small Island) 
These constructions of apparently consistently racist dispositions are signalled by the 
habitual tense ‘would say’ which establishes the ‘generic’ and ‘typified’ forms of 
reported speech and their functions, and also by the use of the reviled ‘hate’ term: 
‘Paki’. These are used to shore up the contrastive, tacitly anti-racist perspective of the 
speakers, whilst simultaneously constructing a particular rural or provincial Cornish 
identity. SB’s potentially ambiguous mention of ‘the ↑◦bla:cks◦’ in line 12 is arguably 
distanced from the speaker by its quieter yet emphatic and lengthened delivery 
combined with a ‘surprised’ tone, suggesting that this is more akin to reported speech 
rather than an expression SB would normally use or an ideology they would ordinarily 
subscribe to. An anti-racist interpretation can also be retrieved by the fact that SB’s turn 
constitutes a ‘second story’ (Sacks 1992), with designed similarities to SA’s story. This 
impression is then further consolidated by the final contribution from SC, arguably a 
‘third story’, whose negative representation of the same racist ‘Londoners’ cited in the 
previous turn arguably helps to further disambiguate SB’s mention of ‘the blacks’ in 
indirect speech, which is then confirmed by laughter from the whole group (and this is a 
good example of how anti-racist meanings, views and ideologies are collaboratively, 
sequentially and incrementally worked up in talk  - the inverse of Condor’s 2006 
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discussion of how public prejudice is jointly accomplished in interaction). Despite the 
potential ambiguity of embedded reported speech, SC’s response here suggests that she 
interprets SB’s speech as reported and thus ‘other’. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper I have been interested to explore the forms and functions of common-sense 
anti-racism as it is performed and deployed in interaction and particularly through 
various forms of reported discourse. I have argued that the ‘common’ element of 
common sense is crucial to an understanding of the ‘undeniable’ status of anti-racism as 
it is accomplished by speakers, as a means of achieving consensus, signalling belonging 
of a particular kind of community, and managing potential disagreement. Common 
knowledge is less a ‘reservoir of shared factual information which exists prior to, and is 
built up during, conversation’ (Edwards, 1997: 117), but rather, the invocation of 
‘common knowledge’ is a way of talking, of managing intersubjectivity, and achieving 
social goals such as presentation management, identity work, persuasion, accounting 
and blame.   
However, I wish to return to my earlier observation that the ‘powerful norms of 
anti-racism’ (Barnes et al 2001: 326), particularly in the kinds of liberal, educated 
contexts of the book club, might lead us to speculate as to why anti-racist stances are 
often achieved in talk using the same kind of rhetorical strategies one might associate 
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with more contested or unpopular stances.  In other words, common sense is usually 
used to naturalise ideological positions and is suggestive of an interactional need to 
counter a possible ‘other view’. Myers, in his analysis of the functions of reported 
speech in focus group discussions, observed that its distancing properties often serve to 
‘mediat[e] disagreement’ by ‘giving participants a way of dealing with possible tensions 
and signalling intended frames’ (1999: 389). 
Whilst most of our examples of common-sense anti-racism seem to offer a 
robust alliance to a specific point of view, other examples are a little more ambiguous, 
and suggestive (as Myers noted) that anxieties continue to exist around discussions of 
race. As Mitchell et al suggest ‘challenging racism is unlikely ever to be completely 
comfortable’ (2011: 339) and similarly Condor concludes ‘[i]n practice, for ordinary 
social actors to openly challenge prejudiced talk as it arises incidentally in the flow of 
mundane conversation might seriously jeopardise their relationship with others’ (2006: 
16).  In the following quote, the speaker uses a form of ellipsis (‘enough said’) which 
foreshortens his assessment (and removes potential reported talk). 
 
EXTRACT M 
1  S9 I mean I related to it (.) quite positively I I liked it but  
2 for some of the reasons I touched on before it’s set in a part  
3 of London where my (0.2) >grandparents lived and my mother grew 
4 up< so I knew all those (0.2) areas I remember their reaction  
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5 to (.)immigrants enough sa:id (0.2) em 
(Edinburgh, MBG, WhiteTeeth) 
 
One reading of this is that ellipsis indexes shared knowledge, and the assumption that 
the listener will be able to supply the ‘missing’ token (i.e. that their reaction to 
immigrants is so objectionable as to be literally censored). Another reading might 
suggest that such an abrupt and censoring move operates to suppress discussion or the 
articulation of any alternative view, so that ellipsis in this instance sustains ambiguity 
around immigration and its evaluation. In other words, the ‘common-sense’ status of 
anti-racism, and its evasive, elliptical properties may, in some circumstances, operate to 
accommodate a range of unknowable views. The dilemma that arguably prompts the 
‘common-sense’ forms of anti-racism is that either your interlocutors will need 
convincing that you are not racist, or that the interlocutors themselves cannot be 
trusted not to be racist. As Barnes et al observe ‘[t]he need for a strategy to avoid 
inferences of racism means that the risk of such an inference is genuine’ (2001: 328). 
Similarly Whitehead observes in his study of race training group discussions that 
 
[I]ndividuals may design their actions according to a racial interpretive framework solely as a 
consequence of the expectation that others may be using such a framework to interpret their 
actions, and that others may hold them accountable for those actions on the basis of that 
framework. (2009: 339) 
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In the broad communicative network that is ‘race talk’ we can see a continuum of 
common-sense discourse, from strategies of ‘new racism’, to defensive anticipation of 
the inference of racial common sense, to positive alignment to an anti-racist identity. All 
of these stances, frequently accomplished through the collaborative resources of 
sequential talk, reveal a sensitivity to the powerful stigma of racial prejudice that 
permeates almost all areas of contemporary social life. 
 
Funding 
This work was supported by an AHRC Diaspora, Migration and Identities large grant 
(2007-2010) 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Andrew Smith, Elizabeth Stokoe, Joe Bray, Mark Nixon and an 
anonymous reviewer for their insightful input into the development of this article. 
Thanks must also go to Tessa Carroll for her work in collating some of the data. 
 
References 
Barker, M. (1981) The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. 
London: Junction Books.  
35 
 
Barnes, B., Palmary, I. and Durrheim, K. (2001) The denial of racism: The role of 
humor, personal experience, and self-censorship. Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology 20: 321-338. 
Benwell, B., Procter, J. and Robinson, G. (2012) That may be where I come from, but 
that’s not how I read: Diaspora, location and reading identities. In B. Benwell, J. 
Procter and G. Robinson (eds) Postcolonial Audiences: Readers, Viewers and 
Reception. London/NY: Routledge, 43-56. 
Billig, M., Condor, S., Edwards, D., Gane, M., Middleton, D. and Radley, A.R. (1988) 
Ideological Dilemmas. London: Sage Publications. 
Billig, M. (1996). Arguing and Thinking: a rhetorical approach to social psychology, 
revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Billig, M. (2001) Humour and hatred: The racist jokes of the Ku Klux Klan, Discourse 
and Society 12 (3): 267-289. 
Bonilla-Silva, E. and Forman, T. (2000) ‘I am not a racist but…’: Mapping white 
college students’ racist ideology in the USA. Discourse and Society 11(1): 50-85. 
Buttny, R. (1997) Reported speech in talking race on campus. Human Communication 
Research 23(4):477-506. 
Buttny, R., & Williams, P.L. (2000) Demanding respect: The uses of reported speech in 
discursive constructions of interracial contact. Discourse & Society 11 (1): 109-
133. 
36 
 
Buttny, R. (2003) Multiple voices in talking race: Pakeha reported speech in the 
discursive construction of the racial other. In H. Van den Berg, M. Wetherell, 
H.Houtkoop-Steenstra (eds) Analyzing race talk: Multidisciplinary perspectives 
on the research interview. New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press, 103-
118. 
Clark, H. H., & Gerrig, R. J. (1990) Quotations as demonstrations. Language  66(4): 
764-805. 
Condor, S. (2006) Public prejudice as collaborative accomplishment: Towards a 
dialogic social psychology of racism. Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology 16 (1): 1-18. 
Edwards, D. (1994). Script formulations: A study of event descriptions in conversation.  
Journal of Language and Social Psychology. 13 (3): 211-247. 
Edwards, D. (1997) Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage. 
Fozdar, F. (2010) Duelling discourses, shared weapons: rhetorical techniques used to 
challenge racist arguments. Discourse and Society 19 (4): 529-547. 
Garfinkel, H. (1956) Some sociological concepts and methods for 
psychiatrists.  Psychiatric Research Reports 6: 181-198. 
Garfinkel, H. (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- 
Hall. 
37 
 
Gilroy, P. (1987) Two sides of anti-racism. In P. Gilroy (ed) There Ain’t No Black in the 
Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation. London: Hutchinson, 114-
152. 
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis. New York: Harper and Row. 
Gunn, D. (2004) Free indirect discourse and narrative authority in Emma 
Narrative 12(1): 35-54. 
Holt, E. (1996) Reporting on talk: The use of direct reported speech in conversation. 
Research on Language and Social Interaction 29(3): 219-245. 
Holt, E. (2000) Reporting and reacting: Concurrent responses to reported speech. 
Research on Language and Social Interaction. 33(4): 425-454. 
Jefferson, G. (1990) List-construction as a task and a resource. In George Psathas, (ed) 
Interaction Competence. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 63-92. 
Leech, G. and Short, M. (1981) Style in Fiction. London: Longman. 
Long, E. (2003) Book Clubs: Women and the Uses of Reading in Everyday Life. 
University of Chicago Press. 
McHoul, A. and Watson, D.R. (1984) Two axes for the analysis of ‘commonsense’ and 
‘formal’ geographical knowledge in classroom talk, British Journal of the 
Sociology of Education 5: 281-302. 
38 
 
Mitchell-Kernan, C. (1972) Signifying and marking: Two Afro-American speech acts. 
In J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds) Directions in Sociolinguistics: The 
Ethnography of Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Mitchell, M., Every, D. and Ranzijn, R. (2011) Everyday antiracism in interpersonal 
contexts: Constraining and facilitating factors for ‘speaking up’ against racism.  
 Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 21(4): 329-341. 
Myers, Greg (1999) Functions of reported speech in group discussions. Applied 
Linguistics, 20 (3): 376-401. 
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) (Fourth Edition). Oxford: OUP. 
Oxford English Dictionary online, http://www.oed.com/ accessed 6/9/2011. 
Pollner, M. (1987) Mundane Reason: Reality in Everyday Life and Sociological 
Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pomerantz, A. (1986) Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimizing claims. Human 
Studies, 9 (2-3): 219-229. 
Rapley, M. (1998) ‘Just an ordinary Australian’: Self-categorisation and the discursive 
construction of facticity in ‘new racist’ political rhetoric. British Journal of Social 
Psychology 37(3): 325 344. 
Sacks, H. (1992) Lectures on Conversation. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Schiffrin, D. (1987) Discourse Markers. Cambridge: CUP. 
39 
 
Shoaps, R. (2010) ‘Moral irony’: Modal particles, moral persons and indirect stance-
taking in Sakapultek discourse. Pragmatics 17(2): 297-335. 
Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1981) Irony and the use-mention distinction. In P. Cole 
(ed) Radical Pragmatics. Academic Press, New York, 295-318. 
Stokoe, E. (2010) Gender, conversation analysis, and the anatomy of membership 
categorization practices. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4(7): 428–
438. 
Stokoe, E. (2012, in press) ‘You know how men are’: Description, categorization and 
the anatomy of a categorial practice. Gender and Language. 
Stokoe, E., & Edwards, D. (2007) ‘Black this, black that’: Racial insults and reported 
speech in neighbour complaints and police interrogations. Discourse & Society, 
18(3): 337-372. 
Van den Berg, H., Wetherell, M., Houtkoop-Steenstra, H. (eds) (2003) Analyzing race 
talk: Multidisciplinary perspectives on the research interview. New York, NY, 
US: Cambridge University Press. 
Van Dijk (1987) Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk. 
London:  Sage.  
Van Dijk, (1991) Racism and the Press. London: Routledge. 
Van Dijk, (1992) Discourse and the denial of racism. Discourse and Society 3(1): 87-      
          118. 
40 
 
Verkuyten, M., De Jong, W., Masson, K. (2002) Similarities in anti-racist and racist 
discourse: Dutch local residents talking about ethnic minorities. In J. Giltrow (ed) 
Academic Reading: Reading and Writing in the Disciplines. Broadview Press, 
434-452. 
Wetherell, M., Potter, J., (1992) Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the 
Legitimation of Exploitation. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Whitehead, K. (2009) ‘Categorizing the categorizer’: The management of racial 
common sense in interaction. Social Psychology Quarterly 72 (4): 325-342. 
Yule, G., Mathis, T. and Hopkins, M. (1992) On reporting what was said. ELT Journal 
46(3): 245-251. 
 
 
